DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 476 611 SO 034 533

AUTHOR	Shibata, Masako
TITLE	The Indigenous and Exogenous Aspects of Moral Education: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Military Occupation in Japan and Germany after World War II.
PUB DATE	2002-03-00
NOTE	35p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society (Orlando, FL, March 6-9, 2002).
PUB TYPE	Reports - Evaluative (142) -- Speeches/Meeting Papers (150)
EDRS PRICE	EDRS Price MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS
DESCRIPTORS	Comparative Analysis; Comparative Education; *Educational Change; *Educational Policy; *Educational Practices; Foreign Countries; *United States History; *World War II
IDENTIFIERS	Japan; *Military Occupations; West Germany

ABSTRACT

During the U.S. military occupation of Japan after World War II, few sectors of Japanese society were left untouched. Reforms during the occupation included education, religion, moral values, and gender relations. By contrast, in Germany, except in the Soviet-controlled zone, no radical changes were introduced in the education system during the occupation (1945-1949). The West Germans, who determinedly rejected U.S. educational ideas, began to discuss the deficiencies of their education system and tried to solve them after the withdrawal of the Allied military governments. In Japan, a number of educational reforms failed. Why has Japan been unable to review the education system established under the U.S. occupation? This paper explores specific components of the Japanese education reforms and those in the U.S. occupied zone of Germany to explain the basis for the peculiarly radical changes brought to Japanese education under the occupation. It examines the difficulty in post-war Japan for discussion about the contemporary relevance of these changes. The paper clarifies what occurred in Japanese and German education during the occupation. The Japanese education system largely shifted toward the U.S. model, but the German education system did not. The paper also analyzes conditions for reforms during the occupation. (Contains 95 notes.) (BT)

Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made
from the original document.

ED 476 611

"The Indigenous and Exogenous Aspects of Moral Education: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Military Occupation in Japan and Germany after World War II"

Masako Shibata ©
Part-time lecturer, Doshisha University/Kyoto, Japan

Paper presented at the CIES Annual Meeting on 6 March 2002/ Orlando, FL

1. Introduction

Half century after the end of World War Two, the government in Japan is suggesting that the Japanese should now review seriously the education system established under the US Military Occupation. Education reforms during the Occupation (1945-1952) were radical not only in terms of the number of changes, but also the range of reforms. Hardly any sector of Japanese society was left untouched. Reforms during the Occupation ranged over religion, moral values and gender relationships. In contrast in Germany, except in the Soviet-controlled Zone, no radical changes were introduced in the education system during the Occupation (1945-1949). In the US Zone, no American reform proposals were fully accepted by German leaders.

In the post-Occupation period, Japan and Germany showed another contrast. The West Germans, who determinedly rejected the American educational ideas, began to discuss the deficiencies of their education system and tried to solve them by themselves after the withdrawal of

SO 034 533

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE, AND IN ELECTRONIC MEDIA FOR ERIC COLLECTION SUBSCRIBERS ONLY, HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

M. Shibata

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

2A

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

the Allied Military Governments.[1] In Japan, a number of attempts at educational reform failed. Routinely, so-called 'Japanese liberals', such as school teachers, academics and other 'intellectuals', customarily expressed ferocious disagreement with governmental proposals for reviewing the basic framework of the education system established during the US Military Occupation. Their recent opposition to the government's scheme for the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education of 1947 is a characteristic example.[2] Antipathy of this kind has been common in debates about educational reforms in post-Occupation Japan.

Why has Japan been unable to review the education system established under the Occupation? Why did it become a 'sanctuary' in educational debates in post-Occupation Japan?

In this article, I try to explore the specificities of education reforms in occupied Japan and, by comparison, those in the US Zone of Germany, which would – potentially – explain the basis of the peculiarly radical changes brought into Japanese education under the Occupation, and the difficulty of post-war Japanese in discussing the contemporary relevance of these changes. For this purpose, first of all, what occurred in Japanese and German education during the Occupation is clarified. Later, the conditions for reforms during the Occupation will be analysed.

---

[1] Discussions began toward the end of the Occupation. In 1948, the Ministers of Education of the *Länder* in West Germany formed the *Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder* [Permanent Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs] to adjust regional differences in education. The representatives of the West German *Länder* agreed to make substantial adjustments in practising *Kulturhoheit* in the *Düsseldorfer Abkommen* [Düsseldorf Agreement] of 1955 and the *Hamburger Abkommen* [Hamburg Agreement] of 1964. In 1969, the *Bildungskommission des Deutschen Bildungsrats* [Education Commission of the German Educational Council] proposed the introduction of the *Gesamtschule* [comprehensive school] in all the *Länder*.

Cf. Robinsohn, Saul, and J. Caspar Kuhlmann. 1995. Two Decades of Non-reform in West German Education. In *Education in Germany: Tradition and reform in historical context*, edited by D. Phillips. London: Routledge, pp. 15-35.

[2] In January 2002, the *Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai* [Central Education Council] revealed its plan to hold public hearings throughout the country to discuss the revision of the Law as a core of the *Kyoiku Shinko Kihon Keikaku* [Basic Scheme for Educational Promotion].

2-1. Education reforms in Japan

Overall, the Japanese education system was largely shifted towards the American model. From the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the education system, the practices associated with the Imperial Household and the ideology of State Shinto were the prime targets of the reform of pre-1945 Japanese education.

The Purge of Militarists

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) ordered the purge of militaristic educational personnel on 30 October 1945.[3] However, most of the official educational purge started from May 1946, nine months after the surrender – a start much later than denazification in Germany. In the meantime, approximately 115,000 teachers and educational administrators escaped screening and dismissal by 'resignation'.[4] Actually, the Japanese Ministry of Education took the initiative in the purge, before SCAP took any action.[5] University academics also survived the purge remarkably well, compared with German academics and students.

In contrast, SCAP targeted Japanese Christians first. As early as 24 October 1945, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to purge those who had co-operated with, or had not resisted, the Japanese military regime in Christian schools and universities in Japan. The government delivered

---

[3] "Investigation, Screening, and Certification of Teachers and Educational Officials" of 30 October 1945, Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government by the Central Liaison Office, AG 350 CIE (SCAPIN 212).

[4] Yamamoto, Reiko. 1993. Kyoshoku tsuiho. In *Sengo kyoiku kaikaku tsushi*, edited by Meisei Daigaku Sengo Kyoiku-shi Kenkyu Centre. Tokyo: Meisei University Press, p. 247.

[5] This measure was based on *An Educational Direction for Building New Japan* of 15 September 1945. Yamamoto, Reiko. 1999. Senryo-ka ni okeru kyoshoku tsuiho kensho: CIE staff no shisaku to sono haikei. In *Sengo kyoiku no sogo hyoka*, edited by Tsuchimochi, Hoichi. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, p. 210.

this directive to about one hundred Christian educational institutions throughout the nation.[6] Over eighty institutions were screened within a few days after the enactment of the order. The US government had already had a complete list of 'militarist Christians' at the end of the War. The records of militarist acts were detailed and stretched back as far as the 1930s.

Overall, the purge of militarists in Japanese education was relatively small in scale. The Occupation Authorities attempted to democratise Japanese education in the context of their views on Japanese militarism and ultra-nationalism.

Religious Education

American condemnation of *Shinto* mounted during the War. Thus measures for this act were taken in swift succession after the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945. The policy culminated in the enforcement of the principle of the separation of the State and religion. On 26 September 1945, SCAP issued the 'Plan for Educational Control in Japan under Military Government'. It ordered the Japanese government to "eliminate militaristic and ultra-nationalistic propaganda, [and] official sanction of and support of Shinto".[7] SCAP further enforced the "Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State *Shinto* (*Kokka Shinto, Jinja Shinto*)" on 15 December 1945. Even school cultural excursions to *Shinto* shrines were entirely banned. The complete elimination of religion from public life was sanctioned, firstly, within the

[6] "Violation of Religious Freedom" of 24 October 1945, Memorandum of the Office of Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers for Imperial Japanese Government, AG 000.3. In: Rikkyo Gakuin Hayku-niju-go-nen-shi Henshu Iinkai, ed. 1996. *Rikkyo Gakuin hyaku-niju-go-nen-shi*. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Dainippon Insatsu, pp. 478-479; and "Rikkyo Gaikuin socho ika juichi shi no taishoku yokyu - Rengogun". *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 October 1946.

[7] "Plan for Educational Control in Japan under Military Occupation", Record Group 391, ABC.014 (Japan), (26 September 1945) Washington D. C.: National Archives of the United States, Modern Military Branch. In: Beauchamp, Edward Robert, and James Vardaman, eds. 1994. *Japanese Education since 1945: A documentary study*. London: M. E. Sharpe, p. 60.

Constitution promulgated on 3 November 1946. In conformity with it, the principle of the separation of the State and religion was reaffirmed in the Fundamental Law of Education, enforced on 31 March 1947.

This principle in post-war Japan bore no relation to traditional American or French ideas about seeking an equilibrium between the ecclesiastical power of the church and the secular rights of civil society.[8] In fact, in Japanese history including the war-time period, the *Shinto* authorities had barely intervened in secular politics. On the contrary, Buddhist authorities had provoked confrontation with secular authorities more frequently and sometimes violently in Japanese history.

Robert King Hall of the Civil Information & Education Section (CI&E) later noted that the American measure for Japanese religion was "more than an attempt to separate Church and State"; it was "a direct attack on the very essence of the official national philosophy".[9] William Woodard of the religious section in the CI&E also recalled the American zeal for attacking *Shinto*:

> The concern of the American military with Japanese religions was definitely out of the ordinary. Respect for local customs, including religion, as a basic principle of military government and involvement, not to say interference, in the religious affairs of an occupied country is clearly ruled out by army regulations. Nevertheless from almost the day landings began the Armed Forces found themselves confronted with problems in the field of religion and this situation continued to exist until the termination of the Occupation in April 1952. ... The religions of Japan will never again be what they

[8] Abe, Yoshiya. 1989. *Seikyo Bunri: State and Religion. The religious dimension of politics in Japan and America*. Tokyo: Saimaru Shuppankai, pp. 1-2.
[9] Hall, Robert King, ed. 1949a. *Kokutai No Hongi: Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. v.

were on September 2, 1945, the day the Terms of Surrender were signed aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.[10]

Moral Education *(Shushin)*

As in the elimination of indigenous religion from public schools, instruction in older moral traditions of Japan was banned. *Shushin*, the pre-1945 Japanese moral education largely based on Confucian ethics, had drawn the close attention of the US government from the middle of the War. The State Department asked experts on Japan to examine the contents of *Shushin* textbooks during the War. However, all the examinations concluded that *Shushin* textbooks, particularly before the 1932 edition, were not militaristic.[11] During the Occupation, textbook inspections were continued and particular attention was paid to the descriptions which were antagonistic to Christianity.[12] Post-war examinations arrived at the same conclusions.[13]

Nevertheless, instruction in *Shushin* as well as Japanese history and geography was suspended

---

[10] Woodard, William P. 1972. *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, p. xi. See also: "Article 43 of the Hague Rules", in: Oppenheim, L. 1944. *International Law: A treatise*. Vol. 2. London: Longmans, Green and Co., p. 342. For the account of this American violation of the international law, see: Cohen, Theodore. 1987. *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal*. Edited by H. Passin. New York: The Free Press, p. 7; Iokibe, Makoto. 1985. *Beikoku no Nihon senryo seisaku*. Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, pp. 113-114; and Moore, Ray. 1979. Reflections on the Occupation of Japan. *Journal of Asian Studies*. xxxviii (4), p. 727.

[11] Kaizuka, Shigeki. 1993a. Senryo-ki no 'Sankyoka Teishi Shirei' no seiritsu katei ni kansuru ichi-kosatsu. *Bulletin of Institute of Education, University of Tsukuba* 18 (1), pp. 2-3; and Spinks, Charles Nelson. 1944. Indoctrination and Re-education of Japan's Youth. *Pacific Affairs* 17 (1), p. 68.

[12] "Textbooks on Religion" of 1 September 1948, restricted paper of Far Eastern Section Japan (FEC File #1238, Box 166).

[13] Kaizuka, Shigeki. 1993b. Dotoku kyoiku. In Sengo kyoiku kaikaku tsushi, edited by Meisei Daigaku Sengo Kyoiku-shi Kenkyu Centre. Tokyo: Meisei University Press, p. 199.

on 31 December 1945.[14] Hall, who acted as the head of the CI&E examination group, noted retrospectively that:

> Allied public opinion, plus the fact that the Supreme Commander had already committed himself to the policy, demanded an immediate cessation of all *Shushin* instruction; a page-by-page textual analysis, however, indicated that the textbooks in question were relatively innocuous and that a wholesale ban might not be justified and, if undertaken, might lead to serious censure of the Command on the grounds of "thought control" and "book burning".[15]

H. Wunderlich, Hall's successor, explained to Japanese examiners that this measure was meant to be a 'political gesture' with a 'news value' which would publicise the American achievement in democratising Japanese education.[16] Wunderlich recalled that regardless of the pedagogic analyses, the suspension of the three courses was important for the Occupation as the first political step in the demilitarisation of Japan.

Among all suspended school subjects, only *Shushin* was never restored in Japanese school curricula. Instead, the CI&E suggested that what the Americans called 'social studies' should replace *Shushin*, and the Japanese accepted the idea.

The Principle of Education (*Imperial Rescript on Education*)

While stopping State Shinto and *Shushin* quickly, the US Occupation Authorities treated the

---

[14] "Suspension of Courses in Morals (Shushin), Japanese History, and Geography" of 31 December 1945, memorandum from SCAP for the Imperial Japanese government, AG 000.8 (SCAPIN 519).
[15] Hall, Robert King. 1949b. *Shushin: The ethics of a defeated nation*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, p. 15.
[16] Kaizuka 1993a, op. cit., p. 6.

Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 with more care. Discussions on this issue dragged on until the middle of 1948. This issue, just like the treatment of the Japanese Imperial Household, was politically sensitive both for the Americans and the Japanese.[17] Most of the American criticisms avoided direct attack on the Rescript as such, but concentrated on the enforced rituals related to it, e.g. the recitation of the Rescript and bowing to the Imperial Portraits.[18] Afterwards the final decision on the Imperial Rescript on Education was put aside for over two years.

Another reason for this American hesitation over the immediate abolition of the Imperial Rescript on Education was that SCAP planned to revise it and use its ideological influence on the Japanese. J. J. Schieffelin of SCAP's Government Section (GS) recommended to Ken Dyke, Chief of the CI&E, on 9 December 1945 that:

> SCAP may be missing a best bet if the idea of a new rescript is rejected. ... My thought is that if SCAP wishes to use the immense existing tradition of obedience and respect which pervades the schools, a suggestion could be made to Hirohito [the Emperor] that he produce a new rescript, ...[19]

Japanese educators also brought up the idea of drafting a new Imperial Rescript on Education, in order to retain an educational principle sanctioned by the Emperor. Similar ideas about the

---

[17] "Treatment of the Institution of the Emperor" of 11 December 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East (Notter File 1520 H-128).

[18] "Policy for the Revision of the Japanese Education System" of 21 November 1946, Far Eastern Commission, Committee No. 4. 'Strengthening of Democratic Tendencies Proposals on Educational Policy for Japan' (Restricted) (SCAP File C4-005/6).

[19] "Letter of J. J. Schieffelin, Military Government Section, APO 442 (Kyoto, Honshu) to C.I. and E. Section, Ken R. Dyke" of 9 December 1945 (Trainor Collection Roll 27, Box 30).

retention of a rescript were discussed by leading Japanese educators within the *Kyoiku Sasshin Iinkai* (Japanese Education Reform Committee, JERC).[20] Its Chairman, Nambara Shigeru[21], also agreed with the idea for a revised Imperial Rescript on Education.[22]

Intending to use the 'existing tradition of obedience' of the Japanese, SCAP set up a working group for the creation of a new Rescript.[23] The group was formed in Doshisha University, a Christian university. The group was led by Ariga Tetsutaro, a prominent professor of Protestant theology, with the support of the Jesuit church. The CI&E and Japanese educators worked for the revision of the Imperial Rescript on Education under the leadership of this group. It is suggested that, as the CI&E had perceived, the adherence to the Imperial Rescript on Education by Japanese educators did not derive from their faith in indigenous traditions but had much to do with the influence which they had received from the State political ideology.

The plan for a new rescript was not realised. The idea faded out mainly because SCAP and the CI&E began to find this work time-consuming and shifted their attention to an increasing number of other reforms. After all the discussions, the final decision was made on 19 June 1948. The Lower House in the Diet passed a 'Resolution Eliminating the Imperial Rescript on Education and Related

---

[20] The JERC was formed by the Imperial Ordinance of 19 August 1946 based on American request. The Committee comprised a Chairman, a Vice-chairman, fifty permanent members and some temporary members, "from among the learned and experienced persons of the political, educational, religious, cultural, economic and industrial circles". "Organization of the Educational Reform Committee" of 9 August 1946, Imperial Ordinance No. 373. The JERC was adjourned by the Cabinet Order No. 185 of 12 June 1952.

[21] Japanese names are given in indigenous order, *i.e.* sir name first.

[22] "Comments on the Situation Report – Japan of the Office of Research and Intelligence, Division of Far East Intelligence" of 7 June 1946 (ERJ1 Fiche # 1-B-15). See also; The Japanese Education Reform Council. 1950. *Education Reform in Japan: The present status and the problems involved.* Tokyo: The Japanese Education Reform Council, p. 5; and Kato, Takashi. 1997. *Nambara Shigeru.* Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, pp. 159-160.

[23] Details are in: Kubo, Yoshizo. 1984. Tainichi senryo seisaku to sengo kyoiku kaikaku. Tokyo: Sanseido, pp. 281-307; Suzuki, Eiichi. 1981. Haisen chokugo no Kyoiku Chokugo hihan. Kyoiku (396): 70-81; and Suzuki, Eiichi. 1983. Nihon senryo to kyoiku kaikaku. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, pp. 108-125.

Rescripts' in accordance with the legal basis of the Constitution and the Fundamental Law of Education.

2-2. Education reforms in the US Zone of Germany

In contrast in Germany, the Americans did not receive such co-operation for overall education reforms from the German people. Neither did the Americans show enthusiasm for bringing radical changes in German education. The minimum and the maximum task of the Office of Military Government for Germany of US (OMGUS) was denazification.

The Purge of Militarists (Denazification)

Immediately after the German surrender, the US government held a clear policy for the programme of denazification. As General Clay declared, "Denazification is a 'must'."[24] The OMGUS set up a special branch for the programme and tried to examine all German adults in the US Zone, regardless of their profession, to identify Nazis. The screening questionnaire, *Fragebogen*, consisted of 150 items, instead of 23 questions posed on the limited number of Japanese. As of 15 January 1946, 1,194,000 *Fragebogen* were distributed.[25] In education, the severe purge in schools

[24] Clay's speech on 5 March 1946. Vogel, Walter, and Christoph Weisz, eds. 1989. *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1949. Band 1. Teil 2.* München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, p. 1017. For the significance of denazification, see also: "Control Council Directive No. 32: Disciplinary Measures Against Managing and Administrative Staff of Educational Institutions, Teaching Staff, and Students Guilty of Militaristic, Nazi or Anti-Democratic Propaganda" of 26 June 1946 (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F AGTS/123/4-18); and Historical Division Office of the Executive Secretary Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. 1953. *The West German Education System: With special reference to the policies and programs of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany*, p. 55.

[25] Control Council Law No. 8 "Prohibition of Employment of Nazi Party Members in Positions Other Than Ordinary Labor". "Denazification Report - 15 January 1946: Summary", written on 5 February 1946 by Headquarters U.S. Forces, European Theater, OMGUS Public Safety Branch (Main) (BAK OMGUS Fiche #Z45 F 5/307-2/31).

intensified the shortage of teachers. The purge in universities depended on the leadership of each Rector. Denazification resulted in a relative 'success' in Heidelberg, Frankfurt and Erlangen: the dismissal of seventy-two, thirty-three and thirty faculty members respectively.[26]

As the programme progressed, the stern measures for it proved to be unfeasible. Consequently, its criteria were loosened over time. While in the Russian Zone only 8,000 out of 28,000 school teachers survived denazification screening, denazification in the Western Zones ended somewhat incoherently.[27] Dismissed professors were reinstalled in the university within a few years. After all, the UMGUS had to admit that "complete political purity comes only by miracle [sic] from the Nazi night".[28]

The huge administrative load caused by the severity of denazification eventually reduced initial American zeal for it. Nevertheless, much effort was devoted to this programme. In the middle of October 1947, two hundred and thirty-six people had been dismissed from universities in the US Zone alone.[29] The scale of the denazification of teachers and academics was vast compared with the purge in Japanese education.

Religious Education

In contrast to denazification, the Americans proceeded carefully with religious issues in

---

[26] Tent, James F. 1982. *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and denazification in American Occupied Germany.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 98.

[27] Führ, Christoph. 1997. *The German Education System since 1945.* Bonn: Inter Nationes, p. 13. For the far severer purge of academics in the Russian Zone, see: Jessen, Ralph. 1998. Diktatorischen Elitenwecksel und universitäre Milieus. Hochschullehrer in der SBZ/DDR (1945-1967). In *Universität und Eliten im Osten nach 1945*, edited by J. Kocka. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, p. 31.

[28] "Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany" of 20 September 1946, p. 19 (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/304-2/4-5).

[29] "E&RA Summary Report" of 13 October 1947 (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/304-2/7).

Germany. As early as November 1944, the United States government directed SCAP in Germany that

> You will not intervene in questions of denominational control of German schools or religious instruction in German schools except insofar as may be necessary to ensure that religious instruction and the administration of such schools conform to such regulations as are or may be established for all subjects and all schools.[30]

This was an echo of the Allied decision at the Versailles Education Conference in January 1945 that "the question of denominational control in Germany is one in which the Supreme Commander does not intend to intervene."[31]

This policy was strictly kept in West Germany, regardless of the religious policy of the individual Allies at home. In addition, the fact that the OMGUS was aware of a close political cooperation between the German churches and the Nazi Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs was neglected.[32] The Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany also stated that:

> Ideally, it is nobody's business in a democracy what anybody else believes or does not believe about matters over which reasonable men have always differed. ... Counsels of prudence no less than considerations of humility stop us from trying to impose upon Germany the pattern of church-and-state which has proved so advantageous to both

---

[30] This revised directive was originally drafted in "Directive for Military Government of Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender: Education and Religion Section" of 9 November 1944 (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/307-3/1).

[31] "Minutes of Education Conference of SHAFE G-5 in Versailles on 11 January 1945" (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/306-1/25); and "British Brief for Official Visitors to Germany, General Survey" of October 1948, CCG (BE) Education (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/292-1/10).

[32] "Divisional Recommendations for Assignment of Powers and Functions to German Governmental Levels: II Brief Description of Assignment of Jurisdiction over this (church's) Function and of its Administration" of 25 June 1946, the E&RA. (BAK OMGUS # Z45 F 5/304-1/33); and "Report of the U.S. Occupation of Germany, Religious Affairs Program of 23 September 1947" (BAK OMGUS # Z45 F 5/337-2/6).

parties in America.[33]

This American policy could be explained by two major reasons. First, culturally, from the beginning the Western Allies had no intention of questioning the values of Christianity. Post-war assertions by several Jewish groups that the Nazi Final Solution was undertaken nowhere else than in Christendom and that "the Holocaust was an extreme pattern of political and cultural expression" in European Christendom were never really confronted.[34] On the contrary, the OMGUS helped the campaigns which the German churches opened immediately after the German surrender to publicise how strongly they had opposed the Nazis.[35]

Second, politically, the Allies deliberately avoided confrontations with the German churches, knowing their powerful influence within German society. After the country's surrender, both Catholic and Evangelical Churches quickly protested against the Allied proposals for some transformation of German society. This gave the Americans a clear clue about the political power of the German

---

[33] "Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany", op. cit., p. 21.

[34] Rubenstein states that the US and the British governments refused the request of Jewish leaders in Budapest to bomb the railways for the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz. Rubenstein, Richard L. 1996. Holocaust and Holy War. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 548 (November), p. 31), p. 41.

[35] The exhibition of Catholic Church's struggles with the Nazis was started by the Bishop of Munich on 26 March 1947 in a room of the OMGUS in Bavaria. "Working Party on Public Subsidies to the Catholic Church in Germany", the Directorate of Internal Affairs and Communications of the Allied Religious Affairs Committee, undated. (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/337-2/20). In the post-Occupation period, the publications and photographs of German resistance from the various spheres of society are exhibited in the *Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand Berlin*. For example, *"Widerstehen aus christlichem Glauben"*, Pamphlet No. 5.1 *"Das Leitbild I: Widerstehen aus evangelischem Glauben"*; No. 5.2 *"Das Leitbild II: Widerstehen aus katholischem Glauben"*; and No. 5.3 *"Das Leitbild II: Widerstehen aus katholischem Glauben"*. In Italy, the Occupation Authorities had a particular difficulty in detaching Church authority from the fascist political factions, while attempting the recovery of sound education through Christian education. "Italian Education under Allied Military Government – Based on reports from the War Department" of 30 May 1944. (Secret) (Notter File 1411 PWC 177).

churches.

The consequence was the persisting existence of Christian education along denominational lines, and the endorsement of this in the Basic Law of 1949.

2-3. Reforms in Japan and Germany Compared

Both in Japan and Germany, debates on educational reform covered the areas of not only pedagogy but also of religion, moral-ethical values, and the traditional structure of the two societies.

As shown, however, most of the American reform proposals were actually implemented only in Japan during the Occupation. The pre-1945 education system in Japan was transformed almost *en bloc*. Reforms in Japanese education were more radical than in Germany, in terms of the number of reforms and their influence on society on the whole.

Indeed, the Americans committed themselves to education reforms more in Japan than in Germany. At the same time, reforms in Japan were enabled by the co-operation of the Japanese.

Now, such a remarkable pattern of education invites questions: "Why *could* Japanese education be reformed" between 1945 and 1952? What made the Americans so enthusiastic for reforming the education system in Japan more than in Germany? What sort of conditions in Japan permitted this American enthusiasm to be realized?

3-1. Conditions in Japan

US Power in Japan and the Intensity of the Cold War

In Japan, the United States exerted predominant power. For an 'effective' Occupation, the US

asserted its political hegemony within the Far Eastern Commission (FEC).[36] Japanese neighbours had no political power which could influence the US government, unlike the European Powers. China even declined Roosevelt's frequent invitations to join in the Occupation of Japan.[37]

The American dominance was reinforced by the 'supreme' authority of MacArthur. Roosevelt instructed MacArthur that "You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force."[38] William Sebald, MacArthur's political advisor at SCAP, noted later that "Never before in the history of the United States had such enormous and absolute power been placed in the hands of a single individual".[39] Another SCAP officer recalled that MacArthur's statements sounded to the Japanese like the "voice of God".[40] It has been claimed that the idolatry of 'Emperor MacArthur' was partly eclipsed especially after the gradual release of

---

[36] "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" of 22 September 1945. The Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government. 1949. *Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan.* Tokyo: Foreign Office of Japanese Government, p. 93. The FEC consisted of the eleven Allies, until Pakistan and Burma joined it in November 1948.

Cf. From the 1990s, some studies have claimed that there was a significant contribution of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force to the democratisation of Japan. Bates, Peter. 1993. *Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 1946-52.* London: Brassey's.

[37] Bennett notes that "Chiang [Kai-shek] wisely denied any wish to involve China in these matters [of the Occupation], and the catastrophe of a Chinese occupation army in Japan was avoided." Bennett, John Wheeler, and Anthony Nicholls. 1972. *The Semblance of Peace: The political settlement and the Second World War.* London: Macmillan, pp. 136-137.

[38] "Message to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Concerning the Authorities of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" of 6 September 1945. The Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government 1949, op. cit., p. 109.

[39] Sebald, William. 1965. *With MacArthur in Japan.* New York: Norton and Co., p. 103 (Quoted from: Nishi, T. 1982. *Unconditional Democracy: Education and politics in occupied Japan 1945-1952.* Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p. 34).

[40] Nishi, T. 1982, op. cit., p. 43; and Nishi, Toshio. 1983. *MacArthur no 'hanzai': Hiroku Nihon senryo.* Vol. 1. Tokyo: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha, p. 41. Not only for the Japanese but also for many US officers, MacArthur was an "unapproachable" figure. It was also said that, MacArthur saw only "a half dozen top-flight generals" of the Military Government during his service in Japan. Wides, Harry Emerson. 1954. *Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and its aftermath.* New York: The Macmillan Company, p. 19.

more documents of the Occupation from the 1970s.[41] Nevertheless, apart from the question of MacArthur's personal charisma, judicial, legislative and administrative powers were in the hands of the Supreme Commander in occupied Japan.[42] All through the Occupation, the political authority of General MacArthur was far more powerful in name and deed than that of General Lucius Clay in Germany.[43]

Confrontations between the US and the other Allies, *inter alia*, the Soviet Union were far less intense in Japan than in Germany. Despite the physical devastation of Japan, policies for the economic recovery of Japan and for its integration in capitalist communities were released as late as 1948. Thus, the US Occupation Authority accorded a relatively high political priority to the re-education of the Japanese, including the socio-cultural transformation of the country as a whole.

US Views about Japan

Culturally, most Americans regarded Japan and Germany as fundamentally different. MacArthur's view of Japan was largely based on his strong faith in Western civilisation and Christianity. The view of Japan as a nation insulated from the community of advanced Western civilisation was a common one among most Americans. "The culture of which", said John Taylor of the OMGUS, "never reached a level comparable to that of Germany, the Nazi interregnum

[41] Schonberger, Howard B. 1989. *Aftermath of War: Americans and the remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*. Kent: The Kent State University Press, p. 40. Marline Mayo also suggests that MacArthur's "highly assertive and colorful manner" made later studies of the Occupation in Japan overestimate his power. Mayo, M. J. 1984. American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The role of the Experts. In *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 3-51 and p. 448.

[42] "Message to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Concerning the Authorities of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" of 6 September 1945. The Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government 1949, op. cit., p. 109; and Reischauer, Edwin O. 1957. *The United States and Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University, p. 46.

[43] Cf. The Preface by John McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, in: Smith, Jean Edward, ed. 1974. *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-1949*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

notwithstanding."[44] The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, stated that a post-war world order had to be created by "throwing the weight of our country's moral and material influence" on the defeated countries.[45] With great enthusiasm for democratising Japanese society, the Americans drew up the "Positive Policy" and confirmed the significance of "changes in certain ideologies and ways of thinking" of the Japanese.[46]

In this respect, American leaders, unlike Europeans, believed that non-Western people could also understand the principle of democracy and benefit from it. In the post-World War Two settlement, the implementation of democracy for the European Allies meant 'only in the West'.[47] The American enthusiasm was based on a belief that the re-education of the Japanese was both necessary and possible.

American views about the Japanese education system were essentially critical, too.[48] Problems were found in the whole system of the modern Japanese education system, "even if there had not been injected into it ultra-nationalism and militarism."[49] The impairment of a sound sense of

---

[44] The statement of John W. Taylor, 29 April 1946 (Quoted from: Rosenzweig, Beate. 1998. *Erziehung zur Demokratie?* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, p. 144)

[45] "Statement of Cordell Hull, Secretary of State" of 1 January 1940, Department of State Bulletin, II, 11. In: U.S. Government, Department of State, Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs. 1949. *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945.* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. Publication No. 3580, General Foreign Policy Series 15, p. 5.

[46] "Positive Policy for Reorientation of the Japanese" of 19 July 1945, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC 162/D, Secret) (ERJ1 Fiche # 1-B-5).

[47] Cordell Hull noted that "Prime Minister Churchill repeatedly maintained that Point Three of the Atlantic Charter (the right of self-determination) applied only to the occupied countries of Europe." Hull, Cordell. 1948. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull.* Vol. II. New York: The Macmillan Company, p. 1478.

[48] "Japan: The Education System under Military Government" of 15 July 1944, report by CAC (Notter File 1090 CAC 238).

[49] "Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan" of 30 March 1946, p. 4 (ERJ1 Fiche #2-A-6); and "Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender" of 9 December 1946, the Department of State, Intelligence Research (ERJ1 Fiche # 1-B-16). "Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender" of 9 December 1946, the Department of State, Intelligence Research (ERJ1 Fiche # 1-B-16).

individualism was, in American eyes, a definite product of the Japanese education system and practices from the Meiji Restoration.

The Role of the Japanese

But ironically, the legacy of the Meiji Emperor State facilitated conditions in Japan for the US implementation of its proposals for many and thoroughgoing education reforms. Administratively, the highly centralised State bureaucracy helped SCAP smooth away managerial difficulties in post-war chaos. In general, the Ministry of Education acted as a highly functional communication channel between SCAP and the Japanese educational authorities in towns and villages throughout the nation. With or without full agreement, the Ministry followed the decisions of the CI&E and the JERC, and carried out a number of difficult reforms.

Politically, the power and influence of Japanese leaders were valuable for the Americans in benefiting from the Japanese "habit of obedience to authority and uncritical acceptance of the teachings of their leaders".[50] In terms of the principles of democracy as well, the use of Japanese leaders would sanction the implementation of US-backed reforms in Japan. Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, advised Roosevelt on 2 July 1945 that:

> I think she [Japan] has within her population enough liberal leaders (although now submerged by the terrorists) to be depended upon for her reconstruction as a responsible member of the family of nations. I think she is better in this last respect than Germany was. Her liberals yielded only at the point of the pistol and, so far as I am aware, their liberal attitude has not been personally subverted in the way which

[50] "Positive Policy for Reorientation of the Japanese", op. cit.

was so general in Germany.[51]

Especially in Japan, which was culturally complex to the Americans, they assumed that involving Japanese leaders in the Occupation would be crucial.[52] The "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" stated that:

> In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives.[53]

In addition to what MacArthur termed the Japanese "slavish mentality of adulating a winner", the use of Japanese leaders created a basis for the efficient operation of the Military Occupation in Japan.[54]

Ideologically, in fact, Japanese 'liberals' actually offered willing acceptance of, and co-operation for, the American reform schemes. To the surprise of the CI&E and the Mission itself, the Report was read by Japanese educators as if it were a Bible. Japanese translators of the Report praised

---

[51] "Proposed Program for Japan" of 2 July 1945, memorandum for the President from Henry Stimson. Stimson, Henry L., and McGeorge Bundy. 1948. *On Active Service in Peace and War*. New York: Harper & Brothers, pp. 620-621.
[52] "Positive Policy for Reorientation of the Japanese", op. cit.
[53] "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" of 22 September 1945. The Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government. 1949. *Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan*. Tokyo: Foreign Office of Japanese Government, p. 93.
[54] Quotation from: Bailey, Paul John. 1996. *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the present*. Cambridge: Blackwell, p. 29. By SCAP's order, the Japanese officers and the policemen were subject to salute to the American officers. "Saluting" of 1 November 1945, Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government (AG 250) (SCAPIN 223).

it to the skies in the Preface:

> We regard this historical Report as one of the most distinguished pieces of educational literature in the world. This is the fruit of the idea of democratic education which human beings have achieved by the first half of the twentieth century. The Report expresses the best, the soundest tradition of American democracy. We cannot feel anything but happiness that this precious Report was offered for Japanese education and the good future of Japan. ... Japanese parents, teachers, educational administrators, and every single Japanese should read the Report three times so that they can find the future direction of current Japanese education[55]

MacArthur's exaltation of the Report, "a document of ideas", had also a great impact on his Japanese audience.[56] Criticisms of the Report came only tardily from a small number of Japanese leaders.[57] Mildred McAffee Horton, a member of the Mission, recalled the surprise of the Mission:

> I can't remember any other nation that has such an experience as Japan in its history. A foreign group came to try to revise its educational system. ... I was always surprised that more objections weren't raised.[58]

The reception of the American proposals by the Ministry of Education was also cordial, if not as rapturous as that of some Japanese educators. The Japanese government appointed mainly

---

[55] Shugo, Hiroshi, Seiichi Miyahara, and Seiya Munakata, eds. 1950. *America kyoiku shisetudan hokokusho yokai.* Tokyo: Kokumin Tosho Kankokai, pp. 1-2 (translation by the author of this article).

[56] "General MacArthur's statement to the Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan" of 30 March 1946 (ERJ1 Fiche #2-A-6).

[57] A philosopher, Shimizu Ikutaro, noted that the Report revealed the idealistic, "infantile *naïveté*" of the American educators. Shimizu, Ikutaro. 1951. Konnichi no kyoiku tetsugaku. *Shiso* (322), pp. 2-4.

[58] Interview with Mildred McAffee Horton by the NIER in 1982, in: *NIER Interview.*

university academics or people from the so-called liberal professions as the Ministers of Education during the Occupation.[59] Moreover, half of the Ministers of Education during the Occupation were – oddly in American eyes – Christians.[60]

After the establishment of the JERC, education reform was undertaken by the tripartite co-operation of the CI&E, the Ministry of Education and the JERC. In particular, the CI&E and the JERC worked very closely and harmoniously. The co-operation between these two bodies worked well in offering counterargument to the Ministry of Education, which often hesitated over radical changes. The JERC's Chairman, Nambara, worked so closely with the CI&E that the Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru even called Nambara "a sycophant scholar and an opportunist".[61] Joseph Trainor, Deputy Chief of the CI&E, gave his account of the JERC:

> Thus did the Japan Education Reform Council which more than any other agency, including the Occupation itself, had brought about the achievements in Japanese education, move itself out of existence.[62]

---

[59] The post-war first Minister of Education, Matsumura Kenzo, was in office only for three days until 18 August 1945. Maeda Tamon, the second post-war Minister of Education (18 August 1945 and 13 January 1946) worked as a journalist as well as a bureaucrat at the Home Ministry. Abe Yoshishige (13 January 1946 and 22 May 1946) was a Knatian philosopher at Kyoto Imperial University. Tanaka Kotaro (22 May 1946-31 January 1947), a devout Catholic, was a professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University. Takahashi Seiichiro (31 January 1947-24 May 1947) was a professor of economics at Keio University. Katayama Tetsu (24 May 1947-1 June 1924) was a prominent socialist and a Christian. Mortito Tatsuo (1 June 1947 until 15 October 1948), an assistant professor of politics at Tokyo.

[60] Joseph Trainor found it interesting that so many leaders were Christians in Japan where there were overall so few Christians. Interview with Joseph Trainor by Harry Wray on 9 June 1980, in *NIER Interview*. In fact, since the Meiji period, a number of Japanese leaders came under Christian influence with or without baptism.

[61] Debates between Yoshida and Nambara in: "President Nambara Blasts Premier Yoshida in Counterblast" translation of *Asahi Shimbun* on 7 May 1950 (ERJ2 Fiche # 1-K-6).

[62] Trainor, Joseph. 1983. *Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor's Memoir*. Tokyo: Meisei University Press, p. 119.

The American strategy in using Japanese liberals was a success, as anticipated. To deal with the Ministry of Education, the CI&E attempted to gain support from not only prominent educators, but also Japanese school teachers.[63] With the American support, teachers unions eventually became politically powerful. Ironically, they further developed with socialist and communist influence, and argued with the conservative Japanese government, a faithful American protégé after the Occupation.

3-1. Conditions in Germany

US Power in Germany and the Intensity of the Cold War

The power structure of the Occupation Authorities was more complex in Germany than in Japan. The quadripartite structure of the Occupation caused dissension about Allied policies for Germany. The political, military and economic interests of the Allied Powers clashed. Given the circumstances, the reform of the education system in Germany was in a secondary position within the US Occupation policy.

Economically, all the European victors were exhausted, and the US took the predominant lead in financing the Occupation in Germany.[64] But this did not mean that American policy could play

[63] "Situation Report – Japan" of 26 April 1946, Department of State, Office of Research and Intelligence, Division of Far East Intelligence (ERJI Fiche # 1-B-14).

[64] The British request for financial aid to the United States government, in: *"Eine neue Schlacht um England"* of 9 August 1947, in the Minutes of the Meeting Cultural Politics Committee of the Zones (BAK File # Z2 85). "The Fate of Germany". *The Times*, 4 October 1947. The economic conditions of the French Occupation Authorities were worse. Due to their economic problems, the French Occupation Authorities blocked the German border against these refugees returning to Germany, while keeping a "disproportionately large army" in the French Zone and permitting the relatives of French military officers to reside in the Zone. By October 1946, the Occupation Authorities had accepted altogether 5,878,500 refugees, of which 32.2 per cent was in the U.S. Zone, 29.0 per cent in the British Zone, 0.8 per cent in the French Zone and 38.0 per cent in the Russian Zone. Vogel, Walter, and Christoph Weisz, eds. 1989. *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1949. Band 1. Teil 1.* München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, p. 25. See also, Stolper, Gustav. 1948. *German Realities.* New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, p. 22-23 and p. 70; and Bennett and Nicholls 1972, op. cit., pp. 280-281.

a leading role in the Occupation. 'Pastoralization policy for Germany', suggested by the US Secretary for Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, received strong objections from the British government. The British Foreign Minister Eden asserted that "A starving and a bankrupt Germany in the midst of Europe would poison all of us who are her neighbours."[65]

On the other hand, US policy for the quick political and economic recovery of Germany also invited European protests. The US Secretary of States, James Byrnes, elucidated an American strategy for a 'speedy settlement of Germany' in his Stuttgart Speech on 6 September 1946. This idea brought a storm of protest from the Polish and the French governments. For them, such an "inadvisably premature" idea of the Americans, who had never been terribly harmed by Germans, was not acceptable.[66] American *naïveté* in understanding the European contexts of the 'German Problem' often irritated Germany's neighbours.[67]

The joint effort of the Allies was breaking down, not least due to ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It did not take much time for the US government to be sceptical about the Russian violation of the Potsdam Agreement from July 1945.[68] *The Times* reported in October 1947 that:

MR. MARSHALL said at Moscow that the partition of Germany would reopen the

---

[65] Quoted from: Cairncross, Alec. 1986. *The Price of War: British policy on German reparations 1941-1949*. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 11.

[66] "Telegram from Warsaw", 20 September 1946, which indicated the report of Warsaw Press of 7 September (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 45-46/82/8). For criticisms about Byrnes' idea in the US, see: "A Radio Commentary by Henry Morgenthau, Jr. on 1 May 1947" (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45F 45-46/82/8).

[67] General de Gaulle's speech on 9 June 1948 In: Aron, Raymond. 1990. *Memoirs: Fifty years of political reflection*. New York: Holmes & Meier, p. 183.

[68] "Alleged Soviet Violations of the POTSDAM Protocol and Control Council Directives" of 6 June 1946, from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, USFET to Robert Murphy (Top Secret) (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 POLAD/33/1); *Denazification: Monthly Report*. 20 August 1945 (No. 1), p. 1; and Enders, Ulrich. 1982. *Die Bodenreform in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone 1945-1949 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Bayerns*. Ostfildern: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, p. 2.

door to militant German nationalism; and MR. MOLOTOV pronounced a similar and no less emphatic warning. Yet it would be rash to suppose that any one of these statesmen now expects the London conference to produce the kind of agreement upon which a unified Germany might be restored.[69]

As Clay noted, the continuous negotiation with Stalin's communist totalitarianism, especially after Roosevelt's death, as well as "French intransigence and British suspicion" made the US Occupation in Germany difficult.[70] The Allied confrontations became evident even to the Germans.[71]

Furthermore, the German tradition of the autonomy of the individual *Länder* hampered the construction of an effective communication channel. There was no 'MacArthur' in occupied Germany. Neither Clay nor the OMGUS enjoyed the use of a centrally organised administration to spread their voices to 'every hamlet' throughout Germany as efficiently as MacArthur and SCAP in Japan were able to do. The political power of Clay as well as the OMGUS was limited, when compared with that of MacArthur and SCAP in Japan.

Given the conditions of high political tension in Europe, as Clay has confessed, education reform had never been the major priority of US policy for the Occupation in Germany.[72] The low level of enthusiasm by the Americans for education reforms was clearly shown in the delayed formation of their specific policies for reforms. After its establishment, the Education and Religious Affairs Branch (E&RA) merely existed in the OMGUS without a precise strategy.[73] The E&RA

---

[69] "The Fate of Germany". *The Times*, 4 October 1947.
[70] Smith 1974, op. cit., p. xxvii.
[71] "*Widerspruchsvoll Programm der Stellvertreter*" of 13 November 1947, drafted by German Secretariat of the Zonal Advisory Council (Confidential) (BAK File # Z2 85 III).
[72] "Education and Information Policy" of 31 January 1947, Clay Paper # CC 13662. In: Smith 1974, op. cit., p. 309.
[73] Weisz, Christoph, ed. 1994. *OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerikanische Militärregierung in Deutschland 1945-1949.* München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, pp. 112-113.

remained a 'branch' until March 1948.

US Views about Germany

As well as the complexity of Allied power structure, the views of Germany held by the Americans were not as straightforward as the American views of Japan. Relatively longer and closer interactions with Germany prevented the Americans from holding only critical ideas about its educational traditions. American belief in Western civilisation within Christendom and the fact of Nazi aggression were mutually entangled.

During the War, the psychological remoulding of the German people, later called the re-education of German people, gained ground in Allied discussions. The discussions called for curative measures for a "collective neurosis" of the German people.[74] The Committee on Post-war Programs noted that:

> The basic assumption underlying this approach [of re-education] is that Germany is ill rather than guilty. The cure will involve measures of social and mental therapy calculated to reduce paranoid tendencies.[75]

Culturally, however, the Western Allies generally shared a sense of esteem for German traditions as an important part of the heritage of Western civilisation. The 'Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-education' of May 1945 stated that:

To be effective, the program of German re-education must make increasing use of

---

[74] "Germany: Post-War Reeducation" of 13 December 1943, a secret document of the Committee on Post-war Programs (Notter File #1520-H-128). See also: Introduction by Edward A. Strecker in: Brickner, Richard A. 1943. *Is Germany Incurable?* Philadelphia, p. 18.

[75] "Germany: Post-War Reeducation", op. cit.

those native resources of German civilization ... A potential basis for German self-respect is the justifiable pride of Germans in their former great literary, artistic, scholarly, scientific and religious contributions to civilization.[76]

Historically, the nineteenth-century German school system as a whole had established its prestige among American educators. In the middle of the twentieth century, German education still enjoyed its reputation. A Stanford study reported to the Education and Cultural Relations Division (E&CR) of the OMGUS that "no educational system in the world has ever set and maintained" such high standards of education as in Germany.[77] Among American officers and educators, it was not uncommon to suggest that the 'dishonour' of German education had been an interregnum under the Nazis.[78] Higher education reform was not even on the agenda of the Versailles Education Conference. As a whole, the Americans did not draw a parallel between the German and the Japanese education systems in evaluating them.

Overall, the cultural confidence of the Americans was more modestly expressed in Germany than in Japan. In fact, most European intellectuals viewed North America as a "cultural infant"

---

[76] "Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-Education" of 28/29 May 1945, the State War Navy Coordinating Committee on German Re-education, released as the policy "SWNCC 269/5" on 21 August 1946 (OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/310-2/22).

[77] "Memorandum on Postwar Education Reconstruction in Germany, Prepared by B. Q. Morgan and F. W. Strothmann, Department of German, Stanford University" (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/307-3/20).

Cf. Henry Kellermann argued that the US-German intellectual relationship was "broken" from the 1930s and the Americans had to restore it "from point zero". Kellermann, Henry J. 1978. *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The educational exchange program between the United States and Germany, 1945-1954*. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, p2.

[78] "Memorandum on Postwar Education Reconstruction in Germany"; and the statement of John W. Taylor, 29 April 1946, op. cit.

around the middle of the twentieth century.[79] Alonzo Grace, Director of the E&CR, said that "the thinking American is somewhat embarrassed and chagrined at the average European concept of American culture."[80] Gerard Willem van Loon of the Information Control Division (ICD) also sensed that:

> These people [the German people] have been brought up to believe that *Kultur* was a distinctly Teutonic invention and that Americans were all illiterate millionaires whose sole ambition was to live in a skyscraper on a diet of gin and jazz.[81]

Crucially, the Report of the US Education Mission itself also lacked powerful criticisms about the 'renowned' traditions in Germany. The Mission was conscious of its own dilemma:

> The difficulty of the task is due in no small part to the special character of German culture, with its peculiar defects and virtues. The virulent disease of Nazism developed in a culture of very profound dimensions. No country – unless it be ancient Greece or Rome – has contributed more generously to the common treasures of our civilization. No approach to the German educational problem dare be blind to this achievement or lacking in gratitude for it.[82]

The Role of the Germans

The low level of American enthusiasm for, and low political priority given to, education

[79] Julius, Nicholaus Heinrich. 1939. *Nordamerikas sittliche Zustände: Nach eigenen Anschauungen in den Jahren 1834, 1835 und 1836*. Leipzig.
[80] "Report from Germany: Information of Dr. Grace, Director E&CR for American People" of 1 February 1949 by Alonzo Grace in the OMGUS Newsletter (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/310-2/1).
[81] Quoted from: Bödeker, Birgit. 1993. *Amerikanische Zeitschriften in Deutscher Sprache, 1945-1952*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 30-32.
[82] "Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany", op. cit., p. 4.

reforms provoked the distrust of German leaders in the American Occupation Authorities. Crucially, by the time the E&RA proposed specific reform schemes, the Germans had developed scepticisms about the US educational policies. Even from the outset, the German educational authorities regarded the education reforms on the American model as deterioration. The Bavarian Ministry of Education noted that education reforms directed by a foreign military government would bring nothing better than the "further deterioration" of German education in addition to its destruction by Hitler.[83]

The well-qualified US officers were not necessarily valued highly or welcomed by German leaders. In fact, the OMGUS did not have great difficulties in finding highly qualified officers for its education branch, unlike the case of Japan. Edwin Costell recalls that "I was the only non-Ph.D. ever to serve on the professional staff on the Higher Education Section".[84] Rather such knowledge of US officers about German education often invited confrontation with German leaders. Before the Occupation in Japan, the Americans had learned lessons from "the futile and senseless German resistance".[85]

Neither did the Report of the US Education Mission influence German educators as greatly as in Japan. The German press also called the Report an attempt at the "*Entartungen der deutschen Kultur* [the degeneracy of German culture]".[86] Hundhammer was praised as a "*wahrer Triumphator*" [real victor], as he protected many traditional aspects of German education against the new American models.[87] Despite some disagreement among the *Länder* Ministries, German bureaucrats demanded

---

[83] "*Erziehungsplane auf weite Sicht*" of April 1947, prepared by the Bavarian Minister of Education (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/344-1/5).
[84] Costell, Edwin S. 1990. An American University Officer in Occupied Germany: A personal account 36 years later. In *Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau der Hochschulwesens in Westdeutschland 1945-1952. Teil 2: Die US-Zone*, edited by M. Heinemann. Hildesheim: Verlag August Lax, p. 25.
[85] The Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government 1949, op. cit., p. 7.
[86] "Schwierigkeiten der Umerziehung". *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 October 1946 (BAK File #Z1/1029).
[87] "Dr. Dr. Alois Hundhammer zum 50. Geburtstag". *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, 25/26 February 1950, p. 4.

– strongly like Bavarians or tactically like Bremers – self-administration in educational matters, in contrast to Japanese educational administrators. The Report was by no means read as a 'Bible' by German educators, though it was not completely ignored.

Almost all the plans submitted by the German authorities were not acceptable to the E&RA.[88] The deliberate strategy of the German bureaucrats, in the German *Länder* in the American Zone, in dealing with the OMGUS and E&RA was to react slowly and to wait until the OMGUS ran short of time. What the British called the 'go-slow' strategy – which the Japanese Ministry of Education failed to pursue in front of JERC's zeal for reforms – was also common in the other Western Zones of Germany.[89]

The reactions of leading German educators were even more in contrast to those of the Japanese. For the Germans, their education system needed neither conceptual nor structural changes. Julius Ebbinghaus, Rector of Marburg University, addressed his colleagues and students at Marburg University:

> It seems to you an intolerable, an impossible thought that we should receive our instructions from foreigners, that we should be reprimanded and told how to behave, that we should be thwarted in our right to form a state of our own; it is a thought you feel it your duty to rebel against.[90]

---

[88] "Comments on the Reform Proposals of Württemberg-Baden", "Comments on the Reform Proposals of Hesse", and "Comments on the Reform Proposals of Bavaria" of 2 November 1947, written by Alexander to Clay (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/344-1/5).

[89] "Against 'go-slow' tactics by Germans" of 16 April 1946, Top Secret message by Office of the Deputy Military Governor, Control Commission for Germany (British Element) (PRO File # FO 1006-2-1946); and "Educational Reforms in the French Zone of Occupation in Germany" of 24 January 1948, a report of Ernest de W. Mayer, American Consul (ERG Fiche # 1-A-119).

[90] "The Post-war University Situation: Excerpt from a speech to new students by the Rector Marburg University" of 17 December 1945 (BAK OMGUS Fiche # Z45 F 5/308-2/8).

Karl Jaspers also played a key role in calling for the recovery of German education people by the German people by themselves. For Jaspers and many of his fellow intellectuals in Germany, noting the war guilt and denouncing the esteem for parts of the traditions of the country were not comparable conceptions:

> It is a miracle that we have survived. But it is also our own decision. This decision implies our readiness to accept the consequences of life under such conditions. Our sole dignity in this time without dignity is truth, and the infinite patience of work in spite of all obstacles, of all failures, as long as it is granted to us. The life we have saved we also want to merit. Faithful to our elders and to our country; faithful to our homeland which we recognize in Kant, in Goethe, Lessing, and the other lofty figures, in all that has nobility among us, in our language, in our woods, and mountains, and rivers, and lakes; obedient to the eternal moral commands, we want our true heritage to form us.[91]

Eduard Spranger – another academic who had fought against the Nazis and pursued the 'German ideal' in the post-war period – emphasised *Volksbewußtsein* [folk consciousness] based on the *Selbstachtung* [self-respect] of the German people. For Spranger like many other German scholars, learning education from foreigners was something which would make him "blush".[92]

The Americans recognised a barrier between the Occupation Authorities and German leaders:

> The quality of our staff in charge of cultural and educational affairs has failed to

[91] Jaspers, Karl. 1946. The Rededication of German Scholarship. *The American Scholar* 15 (2), p. 182.
[92] Spranger, Eduard. 1954. *Studium und Lebensführung*, p. 40 (Quoted from: Murata, Noboru. 1969. *Kokka to kyoiku: Spranger seiji kyoiku shiso no kenkyu*. Kyoto: Minerva, p. 3). See also: Giles, Geoffrey J. 1997. Reeducation at Heidelberg University. *Paedagogica Historica* 33 (1), p. 209.

impress German academic circles and has elicited the comments that our cultural efforts are aimed to the level of the "little man" rather than at the achievement of top level performances. Consequently, there exists in Germany an evermore noticeable trend on the part of intellectual circles to draw away from any form of association or identification with Military Governments and to establish the independence of the German intellectual in his struggle for rehabilitation.[93]

Intellectual leaders in Germany, like Jaspers, Spranger and Meinecke, urged a deliberate return to pre-1933 Germany. German leaders maintained their belief in the fundamental values and quality of *Kultur* during the Occupation.

4. Conclusion

The 'successful' reforms in Japanese education were set up by the complex interaction of external and internal conditions: the political power of SCAP in Japan; a relatively high level of political priority to, and American enthusiasm for, education reforms; and, above all, the effective use of Japanese 'liberals'. Crucially, except for bans and purges in the early Occupation, most of the reforms were implemented by 'recommendations' and not by 'military orders'. The reforms covered radical changes in the idea of education, moral-ethical issues, and religion. In disagreements between the CI&E and the Japanese Ministry of Education, the JERC often interceded on behalf of the Americans. The US strategy of gaining the support of 'Westernised' Japanese liberals worked well.

In Germany throughout the Occupation, the OMGUS struggled to establish a system and atmosphere for harmonious co-operation with German leaders. The structure of administrative organs

[93] "Memorandum from Tom Goldstein to Henrz J. Kellermann" of 10 December 1947 (ERG Fiche # 1-A-97).

in Germany was far more complex than in Japan. The OMGUS was caught in a dilemma between its desire for administrative convenience and its belief in the democratic principle of a decentralised education system. In some cases, critical suggestions raised by the Americans worsened the relationship between them. Because of the strong assertion of *Kulturbewußtsein* by German leaders, the Americans were unable to establish constructive communication with the Germans.

In post-Occupation West Germany, however, the Germans began to discuss the deficiencies of their education system after the withdrawal of the Allied Powers. Changes in the traditional patterns of German education gradually occurred toward the end of the Occupation.

In Japan, the basic framework of the major reforms during the Occupation has been preserved ever since the Occupation. The principle of the separation of the State and religion has been in the sanctum of the Japanese Teachers Union and so-called 'Japanese liberals'. In 1958, for example, the Ministry of Education introduced a new subject of moral education (*Dotoku*). But this governmental act has received persistent criticisms by Japanese educators since then. According to the government, educational principles, stated in the Fundamental Law of Education, need substantial revisions, because the Law lacks a clear idea of basic moral and spiritual discipline and national identity. On the governmental argument, Japan needs the kind of fundamental moral statements which Westerners can draw from the Christian code of conduct. Ever since its introduction, however, the Law has never been touched until today. Several governmental attempts for its revision always failed in the face of the opposition of Japanese 'liberals'.

After Japan's denunciation of many aspects of traditional values within education reforms, the question, '*Can* the Japanese Change Their Education System?', is inseparable from the dispute about Japanese preoccupation with the educational absorption of foreign models.

In this respect, the question has been recurrent in Japanese history since the Meiji Restoration.

"In the course of the twentieth century", said Erich Hobsbawm, "there was no operational model other than 'westernisation' " for countries to become 'modern'.[94] Before Hobsbawm, Meiji leaders were quick to understand this theory in the middle of the nineteenth century.

With the rise of the globalisation of society and knowledge towards the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 'transferability of knowledge' in social science and humanities is largely in question. "The cautious reception" is now, according to David Eaton, "given to Western knowledge in numerous other non-Western countries in recent years".[95]

In Japan, with the achievement of economic and educational 'maturity' in statistical terms, the aspiration for 'national development' is now cooling down. At this point, Japanese education seems to need a change of direction with a new vision of the welfare of the people in the post-'catching-up' period, lest Japanese liberals yet again lose their courage to challenge the conservative government as before the War. The current dispute on the revision of the post-war education system might provide a clue for a new, political and cultural direction of the country.

---

[94] Hobsbawm, Erich. 1994. *The Age of Extremes: The short twentieth century*. London, M. Joseph, pp. 199-200.
[95] Easton, David. 1991. The Division, Integration, and Transfer of Knowledge. In *Divided Knowledge: Across disciplines, across cultures*, edited by D. Easton and C. S. Schelling. London: Sage Publications, pp. 7-36. Quotation from p. 24.

Archival Documents and Abbreviations

AG: Adjutant General

AGTS: Adjutant General Top Secret

BAK: *Bundesarchiv Koblenz*

CAC: Civil Affairs Committee

ERG: *The U.S. Occupation of Germany: Educational Reform 1945-1949*, ed. Tsuchimochi, 1991. Washington D. C.: Congressional Information Service, Inc., and Maruzen

ERJ1&2: *Education Reform in Japan, 1945-1952, Part 1&2*, eds. Sato, Suzuki, and Tsuchimochi, 1990&1996. Washington D. C.: Congressional Information Service, Inc., and Maruzen

GHQ: General Headquarters

JERC Minutes: Nihon Kindai Kyoiku Shiryo Kenkyukai, ed. 1995-1998. *Kyoiku Sasshin Iinkai, Kyoiku Sasshin Shingikai Kaigi-roku.* 13 vols. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten

NIER: National Institute for Educational Research

Notter File: *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945*

POLAD: Political Advisers' Office

PWC: Post-War Programs Committee

SCAPIN: SCAP Instruction for the Imperial Japanese Government

SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces

Trainor Collection: *Joseph Trainor Collection*, Hoover Institute, Stanford University

U.S. Department of Education
Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI)
National Library of Education (NLE)
Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC)

ERIC REPRODUCTION RELEASE

I. Document Identification:

Title: The Indigenous and Exogenous Aspects of Moral Education: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Military Occupation in Japan and Germany after World War II

Author: Masako Shibata

Corporate Source:

Publication Date:

II. Reproduction Release:

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche, reproduced paper copy, and electronic media, and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce and disseminate the identified document, please check one of the following three options and sign the release form.

____ Level 1 - Permitting reproduction and dissemination in microfiche or other ERIC archival media (e.g. electronic) and paper copy.

_√_ Level 2A - Permitting reproduction and dissemination in microfiche and in electronic media for ERIC archival collection subscribers only.

____ Level 2B - Permitting reproduction and dissemination in microfiche only.

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but no option is marked, documents will be processed at Level 1.

Sign Here: "I hereby grant to the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) nonexclusive permission to reproduce and disseminate this document as indicated above. Reproduction from the ERIC microfiche or electronic media by persons other than ERIC employees and its system contractors requires permission from the copyright holder. Exception is made for non-profit reproduction by libraries and other service agencies to satisfy information needs of educators in response to discrete inquiries."

Signature: Masako Shibata

Printed Name: Masako Shibata (Dr.)

Address: 3145-1 Oshinohara, Yasu, Shiga 520-2313

Position: Part-time lecturer

Organization: Doshisha University

Telephone No: +81-77-587-0445

Date: 8 November 2002

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (FROM NON-ERIC SOURCE):

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, *or*, if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents that cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:
Address:
Price:

IV. REFERRAL OF ERIC TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER:

If the right to grant this reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

Name:
Address:

V. WHERE TO SEND THIS FORM:

Send this form to the following ERIC Clearinghouse:

ERIC/CHESS
2805 E. Tenth Street, #120
Bloomington, IN 47408

However, if solicited by the ERIC Facility, or if making an unsolicited contribution to ERIC, return this form (and the document being contributed) to:

ERIC Processing and Reference Facility
4483-A Forbes Boulevard
Lanham, Maryland 20706

Telephone: 301-552-4200
Toll Free: 800-799-3742
FAX: 301-552-4700
e-mail: ericfac@inet.ed.gov
WWW: http://ericfacility.org

EFF-088 (Rev. 2/2001)